The Illusory Opposition——On the Internal Relation between Phenomenal Concepts and Private Language
There are two different interpretations in contemporary discussion of the relation between phenomenal concepts and private language: the radical position and the moderate position. The former holds that there exist pure phenomenal concepts which cannot be expressed in principle. The latter acknowledges that phenomenal concepts are expressible, but the words used to express them are private, and they are meaningful private language in an introspective-recognitional mode. However, purely phenomenal concepts, when situated within the background of public language, either become meaningless sounds or change into public language. The privacy of these words can also be corrected by the distinction between private and personal language. And the introspective-recognitional mode is finally revealed as the ability for the subject’s self-ascription by a quotational model. Therefore, the phenomenal concepts do not ultimately lead to any form of private language.
Audi, R. (1999). The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Ball, D. (2009). There are no phenomenal concepts. Mind, 118(472), 935–962. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp134
Block, N. (2007). Max Black’s objection to mind-body identity. In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: New essays on consciousness and physicalism (pp. 249–306). Oxford University Press.
Balog, K. (2009). Phenomenal concepts. In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, & S. Walter (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind (pp. 292–312). Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (2003). The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New philosophical perspectives (pp. 220–272). Oxford University Press.
Child, W. (2015). Wittgenstein and phenomenal concepts. In M. Campbell & M. O’Sullivan (Eds.), Wittgenstein and perception (pp. 84–103). Routledge.
Demircioglu, E. (2013). Physicalism and phenomenal concepts. Philosophical Studies, 165(1), 257–277. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9959-7
Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Insight and illusion: Themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136. https://doi.org/10.2307/2960077
Levin, J. (2007). What is a phenomenal concept? In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: New essays on consciousness and physicalism (pp. 87–110). Oxford University Press.
Loar, B. (1990). Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 81–108. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214188
Loar, B. (1997). Phenomenal states. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness: Philosophical debates (pp. 597–616). MIT Press.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914
Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199243824.001.0001
Papineau, D. (2011). Phenomenal concepts and the private language argument. American Philosophical Quarterly, 48(2), 175–184. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025086
Peacocke, C. (2008). Truly understood. Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. (2001). Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness. MIT Press.
Prinz, M., & Pris, F. I. (2013). Phenomenal concepts and Wittgenstein’s private language argument. In Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium (pp. 326–328). Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Stoljar, D. (2005). Physicalism and phenomenal concepts. Mind & Language, 20(5), 469–494. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00296.x
Stoljar, D. (2010). Physicalism. Routledge.
Stroud, B. (2000). Meaning, understanding, and practice: Philosophical essays. Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On certainty. Harper & Row.
Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical investigations. Wiley-Blackwell. (Original work published 1953)