Incomplete contract theory is often used for economic analysis of property rights, but there is a lack of analysis and research on social rights such as the right to food safety guarantee. This paper makes a normative analysis of the right to food safety guarantee from utilitarianism, Rawls's contract theory to Nozick's extreme rightsism, and discusses the connotation of the right to food safety guarantee from the perspective of different theoretical paradigms. Based on this, through the incomplete contractual relationship between producers, consumers and regulators, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the implementation cost of right to food safety guarantee, and finds that government regulators are burdened with high implementation costs of right to food safety guarantee, and "regulatory involution" has become a rational choice for regulators. However, "involution" investment is not a long-term solution. Therefore, the return of the responsibility of market entities, the standardization and traceability of the market transaction process, and the strict testing of products before entering the market have become effective choices for food safety guarantee.