Suspend Animal Pain Without Moral Indifference
Pain is essentially an subjective experience, which makes third-person judgments about others’ pain inherently lack the first-person authority. It is particularly difficult for humans to confirm the pain of non-human animals, dual to the third-person perspective and the cross-species attempt. Confirmation differs from speculation. Although behaviors, neurophysiological states, and evolutionary reason can be used for speculating about animal pain, they cannot be regarded as solid bases for confirming animal pain. Therefore, suspending animal pain is a relatively cautious epistemological attitude. This suspension can prevent us from making erroneous judgments about animal pain and avoid treating animals in an anthropocentric way. It does not imply moral indifference towards animals, nor does it oppose animal assistance actions; rather, it advocates returning to animals as much as possible and, in an effort to free us from human perspectives, demonstrates real respect and care for animals.
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