Porcelain Publishing / JHC / Volume 7 / Issue 2 / DOI: 10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469901.20230702
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What Is Scientific Misunderstanding?

Stefan Petkov1 Haomiao Yu2
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1 Beijing Normal University, China
2 University of Guelph, Canada
Published: 27 November 2023
© 2023 by the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
Abstract

We present the negative phenomena of understanding in relation to scientific explanations. We begin by formulating the distinction between genuine understanding and lack of understanding, to define the epistemic category of misunderstanding. We illustrate misunderstanding with a short meta-philosophical study on the current debates about distinctively mathematical explanations.

Keywords
Explanatory Understanding; Epistemic Inclination; Misunderstanding; Phenomenology; Distinctively Mathematical Explanations
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Journal of Human Cognition, Electronic ISSN: 2753-5215 Print ISSN: 2515-4699, Published by Porcelain Publishing