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Composite Agency and Artifact Abilities
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1
Institute of Philosophy, Free University of Berlin,
Germany
© Invalid date by the Author(s). This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
Abstract
Since we have witnessed the rampant development of technology in recent years and worries concerning the independence of artifacts and potential antagonism between artifacts and human beings are proliferated, a philosophical investigation into the nature of artifacts is especially pressing. This essay invokes the resources from the contemporary philosophy of dispositions and abilities to provide a novel perspective of the metaphysical nature of artifact function (and hence artifacts abilities) with a special focus on the role of human beings in relation to artifacts via the process of their ability-manifestation. By introducing and discussing some interconnected issues in contemporary debates including semantic analysis, intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, and causal basis, this essay is anticipated to establish a sophisticated account of artifacts abilities, which suggests that artifacts abilities must be understood as the composite agency with human beings are an essential constituent.
Keywords
Disposition; Abilities; Artifact
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