A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action
Ordinary action explanation formulated as "I am doing A because I am doing B" is explanation of an action in terms of another action-in-progress. According to Michael Thompson, the explained action is a teleological part of the explaining complex action, which is composed of different parts. Thompson's analysis focuses on the part-whole relation between the explained action and the explaining action, thus ignores a possibility: these two actions can be two different parts of a complex action. I shall argue that the interrelation between different parts of a complex action corresponds to a new kind of action explanation of the formulas: "I am doing A because I am doing B" and "I am doing B because I have done A", where A and B are two different parts of a complex action. This kind of action explanation is associated with the temporal schema of an action-type, for example, X: First, do A; second, do B; then, C; finally, D. This is an attempt to probe into the inner structure of complex action.
[1]Anscombe G E M.Intention[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2000.
[2]Austin J L.A Plea for Excuses[M].Oxford:Clarendon Press,1961.
[3]Boyle L.Goodness and Desire[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010.
[4]Davidson D.Action,Reasons and Causes[J].Essays on Actions and Events,2001,3-20.
[5]Davidson D.Agency[J].Essays on Actions and Events,2001,43-62.
[6]Falvey.Knowledge in Intention[J].Philosophical Studies,2000,99(1):21-44.
[7]Frey J.Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good[J].Ergo,2019,39:1121-1151.
[8]Frey J.Happiness as the Constitutive Principle of Action in Thomas Aquinas[J].Philosophical Explorations,2019,22(2):208-221.
[9]Ford A.Action and Generality[J].Pittsburgh PhD Dissertation,2008.
[10]Ford A.Essays on Anscombe’s Intention[M].Cambridge:Harvard Univer‐sity Press,2011.
[11]Lavin D.Must There Be Basic Actions[J].Noûs,2013,47(2):273-301.
[12]Müller A.Backward-looking Rationality and the Unity of Practical Reason[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2011.
[13]Rödl S.Self-Consciousness[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2007.
[14]Rödl S.The Form of the Will[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2010.
[15]Setiya K.Reasons without Rationalism[M].Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress,2007.
[16]Smith M.The Structure of Orthonomy[J].Royal Institute of PhilosophySupplement,2004,55:165-193.
[17]Stout R.Ballistic Action[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2018.
[18]Tenenbaum S.Desire,Practical Reason,and the Good[M].Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2010.
[19]Thompson M.Life and Action[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2008.
[20]Wilson G.The Intentionality of Human Action[M].Stanford:Stanford Uni‐versity Press,1989.
[21]Valaris M.The Instrumental Structure of Actions[J].Philosophical Quar‐terly,2015,65:64-83.